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CAP REFORM AND THE MEDITERRANEAN EU-MEMBER STATES 
 
Abstract 
In the previous years the Mediterranean Member States of the EU came across the Reform of the CAP 
and especially last year faced the second wave of the Reform for three typical Mediterranean products, 
namely cotton, olive oil and tobacco. In this paper a partial equilibrium model is used to simulate the 
impacts of decoupling, as a key point of the decided CAP Reform. The second wave of the Reform 
appears to be of crucial importance for the southern EU countries and although the producer’s income 
is reduced, there are positive welfare effects. 
Keywords: decoupling, partial equilibrium model, CAP Reform, Greece, Italy, Spain; Q18; Q17; D59 
 
Introduction 
In recent years the European Union has put its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to an 
immense reform process. The latest reform of the CAP was first discussed in 1999 in the Council of 
the Ministers of Agriculture in Berlin. The proposals of this Council, mostly known as “Agenda 2000” 
were limited up until 2006 and were meant to be revised in 2003. In July 2002 the Commission 
published the Mid Term Review of the CAP, as a communication between the Commission and the 
European Council. This was not only a review of the situation in agriculture, but also involved new 
reform proposals. The proposals were revised and adopted in 2003 by the Council of Luxembourg, 
now known as the Luxembourg Agreement, providing the framework of agriculture in the European 
Union for the next 10 years.  
The proposals for a reform of the three Mediterranean products, tobacco, cotton and olive oil, 
followed later, on September 2003 and were discussed and reviewed by the Council on April 2004. 
They are considered to be a follow up of the Luxembourg Agreement and were not included in the 
original proposals of 2002, because these products were coming from recent changes that had just 
been decided by the Council. For tobacco the pressure for an immediate abolition of support from the 
European Parliament was very intense and the prolongation of the existing support regime was agreed 
upon very positively by the producer countries. For cotton the Council had adopted a reform in 2001. 
For olive oil the prolongation of the regime was necessary since no producing country had prepared 
the olive oil registers and thus risking automatic reductions in support (Commission, 2004). 
One could argue that the CAP reform is already well analysed and indeed several models have 
been employed for the analysis of the impacts of the recent CAP reform. A wider view on modelling 
exercises of the Luxembourg Agreement give Balkhausen et al. (2005). On the contrary, only few 
attention has been given to the reform of the three Mediterranean products. For example Karagiannis 
(2005) employs a partial equilibrium model for analysing the impacts of the changed cotton regime on 
the producers welfare. This reform implies further adjustments for the Mediterranean agriculture and 
is strong related and thus, particularly up-to date in 2005 – year of the Mediterranean as it is by the 
EU-Commission declared – 10 years after the Barcelona Agreement. The discussion for the future of 
the Mediterranean agriculture should be based therefore on sound empirical studies.  
In this context this poster tries to provide fresh analysis concerning the Mediterranean area and 
some typical for the region products. An empirical analysis was conducted in order to provide 
information about the impacts of the CAP Reform on the allocation of resources and distribution of 
income on the agricultural markets of cotton, olive oil and tobacco of the Mediterranean EU member-
states. In the second part the political background of the CAP Reform is briefly presented. The third 
part is devoted to the conceptual framework and its implementation in the partial equilibrium model 
AGRISIM. In the fourth part illustrative simulation results are discussed, whereas, after concluding 
remarks in the fifth part follow in the annex extensive tables of the results. 
 
Political Background 
The major elements of the new CAP can be summarized by three keywords, that is decoupling, 
modulation and cross-compliance, although, it should be noted that this is not the first time that these 
words are included in the CAP. Under decoupling and modulation are meant the introduced changes of 
the payments to EU farmers. These payments on the one side will no longer be dependent on the 
production of a good and will be in form of a Single Farm Payment (decoupling) and on the other side, 
as far as the direct payments are concerned, will be reduced for the large farms receiving more than   3
5000€ (modulation). They are linked to environmental, food safety, animal and plant health and 
animal welfare standards (cross-compliance). The objective of the new CAP is a competitive 
agriculture, where production is determined by the international market forces and not by different 
support levels of agricultural products as it used to be in practice in the EU. 
Regarding the three Mediterranean commodities and taken into account that no price cuts are 
necessary, the Commission’s proposals concern only the decoupling of these direct payments and the 
introduction of a Single Farm Payment. The decoupled payments will be linked to environmental and 
food safety standards through cross-compliance and will be subject to the modulation and financial 
discipline mechanisms. For each sector though different approaches are proposed, since they face 
different problems and there are differences in their long-term priorities (Commission, 2003a; 2004). 
For olive oil a conversion of a minimum of 60% of the coupled payments for holdings larger than 
0.3 hectares for the reference period into entitlements to the single farm payment is decided. As a 
reference period for the calculation of the initial payments the four marketing years 1999/00-2002/03 
will serve. 40% of the initial payments may be retained by the member states as an additional olive 
prove payment per hectare and will have the form of a national envelope. Current private storage 
measures will be kept as safety net mechanisms. Refunds for exports and for the manufacture of 
certain preserved food will be abolished (Council, 2004). For holdings smaller than 0.3 hectares the 
payments will be completely decoupled. The member states may decide by August 2005 the 
implementation of the reform i.e. to set a higher rate of decoupled payments and the reform will enter 
into force by 2006. 
For tobacco the Council decided a gradual decoupling of the existing tobacco premium in parallel 
with the establishment of a financial restructuring envelop, within the second pillar of the CAP, to 
support a more sustainable policy for the sector in the future. A transitional period towards full 
decoupling is suggested from 2006 to 2010. During this period 40% of the current payment must be 
decoupled and a maximum of 60% can be maintained as coupled. The production quotas are kept in 
order to define the quantities that are entitled to receive the coupled payment. At the end of this period 
the aid for tobacco will be fully decoupled and 50% of it will be included in the single farm payment, 
50% will be transferred to the restructuring envelope, whereas the current CMO will not apply 
(Council, 2004). 
For cotton two types of payment are introduced: the single farm payment and a payment of 
eligible area per hectare of cotton, representing the decoupled and coupled part of the payment 
respectively. Member states must transfer 65% of the producer-support expenditure to the single farm 
payment and grant the other 35% as area payment. The eligible area is 370,000 ha for Greece, with a 
different amount of coupled aid (594 €/ha for the first 300,000 ha and 342.85 €/ha for the remaining 
70,000 ha), 85,000 ha for Spain with coupled aid of 898 €/ha and 360 ha for Portugal with 556 €/ha as 
coupled payment. This area payment will be reduced proportionately if production exceeds the 
maximum area of the member state (Council, 2004).  
The production for these three products is highly concentrated in certain regions, many of them 
lagging behind in economic development and employs a large proportion of the rural population and 
often account for 10% or more of the agricultural production in some countries (European 
Commission, 2004). For example cotton is cultivated mainly in Greece in Thessaly, Macedonia-
Thrace, Sterea Ellada and in Spain in Andalusia, Murcia and Valencia (Directorate-General for 
Agriculture, 2003). The main production areas of tobacco are the provinces of Macedonia-Thrace, 
Thessaly and west Sterea Ellada in Greece, Extremadura in Spain and Umbria, Campania, Aquitane 
and Veneto in Italy (Commission, 2003b). Furthermore due to geographical constrains those areas do 
not offer many alternatives for other economic activities and for the cultivation of other crops which 
maybe more competitive. Therefore special consideration should be given to the impacts on these 
sectors of decoupling payments. Abandoning production due to decoupling for instance, would 
generate significant negative impacts for rural development.  
 
Conceptual Framework 
Implementation of decoupling 
The coupled payments under the Agenda 2000 were initially granted as compensation payments 
for price cuts in the MacSharry reform from 1992. The introduction of those payments could be 
considered as a shift of subsidies from the actual quantity of a product produced to the actual product 
itself. For example the level of the payment the farmer received was determined by the cultivation of   4
wheat and not by the amount of wheat produced. As a next step, the decoupled payments – particularly 
in association with cross-compliance – shifts the payments from the single product to the whole 
agricultural production. For example, the planting of wheat does not qualify for a payment, but rather 
the cultivation of agricultural land. 
There is thus a distinction between the 2 phases of decoupling, i.e. between the decoupling of the 
payments from the produced quantity and the Single Farm Payment there. The Single Farm Payment 
and its regional implementation according to the EU Regulation 1782/2003, influences the production 
and therefore has impacts on the market and these impacts are again determined by the production 
effects of payments. A more elaborate discussion on how “coupled or decoupled” the introduced 
decoupled payments of the Luxembourg Agreement can be found for example in Binfield et al. 
(2005). Thus, the theoretical challenge for analysing decoupling is to define a pragmatic term of 
“production-effectiveness” of direct payments to work with and to analyze the production-
effectiveness of the granted payment.  
The production-effectiveness can be defined as the share of direct payments to cause changes in 
the production structure compared to a situation without direct payments and thus varies between 0% 
and 100%. The direct payment can be converted ceteris paribus into an increase of the producer price, 
that leads to the same results for the produced quantity. Hence, a producer incentive price results from 
the farm gate price increased by the production-effective direct payment.  
In order to analyse empirically the effects of decoupling according to the above definition specific 
steps were necessary (Figure 1). First, the total sum of all decoupled payments is calculated. Dividing 
this total sum by the relevant total area, the decoupled payment per hectare is determined. The relevant 
total area consists of the area used for cereals including rice, oilseeds, sugar beet, sugar cane, cotton, 
olive oil, tobacco and of the forage area. For crops, the result is equivalent to the subsidy per 
production activity level per hectare. Dividing this result by the stocking density regarding livestock 
activities, the subsidy per production activity level is determined for the products of ruminants, i.e. 
milk and beef. Pig and poultry meat are assumed not to be directly affected by decoupled payments. 
Dividing the decoupled payment per production activity level for every product by its average yield, 
leads to a subsidy per unit of output. The impact on the producer incentive price for every product 
arises from the multiplication of this subsidy per ton by a specific multiplier for the production-
effectiveness of direct payments. It should be noted that all subsidies in the model affect the producer 
incentive price. 
 
Figure 1: The path of decoupling in AGRISIM 
 
 
The model AGRISIM 
An adjusted version of the world trade model AGRISIM is used for the empirical analysis. 
AGRISIM is a partial equilibrium, multi commodity, multi region model, comparative static in nature, 
with non – linear supply and demand functions and constant elasticities. Policy interventions are 
considered as changes of nominal protections rate, price transmission elasticities, minimum producer 
prices, production quotas and subsidies, whereas through shift coefficients in the demand and supply 
functions additional variables can be simulated, like population and income growth (for more details 
see Pustovit, 2003; Schmitz, 2002). The base version of the model includes 9 commodities: wheat, 
coarse grains, rice, oilseeds, sugar, milk, beef, pig meat and poultry meat. The database was recently 
updated for the year 2001. 
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The adjustments of the model concern the regions and the commodities, in order to be able to 
illustrate better the second wave of the Reform of the CAP. AGRISIM is extended by the three 
commodities olive oil, tobacco and cotton, whereas the regions are reorganized and the world is 
organised into 17 regions. In this version Greece, Italy, Spain and the rest of the Member States of the 
EU15, are modelled separately in order to extract the impacts of the agreed decoupled payments, as 
included in the reformed CAP, on those four countries/regions. The other regions/counties included 
are the new Member States of the EU without Cyprus and Malta (i.e. Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia), Russia & Ukraine, Turkey, Australia, USA, 
Mexico, Japan, Rest of OECD countries (Canada, Iceland, Korea, Norway, New Zealand, 
Switzerland), Brazil, China, South Africa and Rest of World.  
 
Implementation of the CAP Reform 
The implementation of the reformed CAP is realised under different scenarios, as Table 1 shows. 
In the first scenario only the first wave of the latest CAP Reform is modelled and all direct 
payments for the initial products included in the Luxembourg Agreement, i.e. wheat, coarse grains, 
oilseeds, rice, sugar, milk and beef are fully decoupled in the model. It should be noted that the option 
of full decoupling is chosen instead of the partial decoupling since most of the EU Member countries 
have expressed themselves towards not using the provisions of coupling (Agra-Europa, 2004). 
Furthermore as the model is comparative static and makes projections within a 10 year horizon only 
final situations regarding changes in the parameters of the model is suggestive to be modelled, like 
final changes due to an altered policy regime and not changes of a transitional implementation of the 
new policy regimes, fact that encourages the modelling of the full decoupling option. In the last 
scenario on the other hand only the second wave of the CAP Reform, i.e. the reform for cotton, olive 
oil and tobacco is modelled. Through these two scenarios is examined if and how much the 
Mediterranean EU countries are affected by each wave of the Reform and avoiding overlapping effects 
by modelling at once both waves.  
Table 1: Base Assumption (BA) and simulated Scenarios (SC) 
  Agenda 
2000 
Lux. agreement  Tobacco  Cotton  Olive oil 
BA  ￿  -  -  -  - 
SC1 
￿ 
Total decoupling of 
all direct payments 
for all products 
except of tobacco, 
cotton, olive oil 
-  -  - 
SC2 
￿ 
Same as SC1  100% decoupling, 
direct payments 

















Same as SC1  Same as SC2  Same as SC3  100% 
decoupling, 
direct payments 
reduced by 40% 
SC5  ￿  -  Same as SC2  Same as SC2  Same as SC2 
Source: own illustration 
 
In the second, third and fourth scenario the complete CAP Reform is modelled using the 
assumptions of the first scenario with small differences between the scenarios, depending on the 
implementation of the new policy regime the Member States will choose. In the second scenario the 
direct payments for tobacco, cotton and olive oil are decoupled, but all provisions of coupling for these 
two products are used. For tobacco all payments provided as production aid must be decoupled after 
2010 and 50% of them will go to the Restructuring Envelope and therefore will no longer be provided 
as direct payment to the producers. In the third and fourth scenario all direct payments for all products   6
are decoupled. Their only difference is that in the fourth scenario the production aid of olive oil is 
reduced by 40%. This 40% goes to the National Envelope and the Member States can distribute it to 
the producers as a coupled payment (SC2), as a decoupled payment (SC3) or use it for other purposes, 
like restructuring of the olive proves and the cultivation areas (SC4).  
The base year is 2001 and therefore the base assumption for all scenarios is the fully 
implementation of Agenda 2000, without reforms on the milk market. As a consequence reforms 
under Agenda 2000 from the years 2002 and 2003 are not implemented in the base year. In order to 
include these reforms direct payments for oilseeds and beef prices were decreased and direct payments 
for beef were increased.  
The variation of the multipliers for production-effectiveness is used in sensitivity analyses and 
thus three sub-scenarios are modelled for every main scenario. The production-effectiveness is 
modelled to be a) initial to the previously existing coupled payments, b) half of them and c) the 
decoupled payments have no production effects. 
 
Illustrative Simulation Results 
The results involve changes in prices, produced quantities, consumption, net trade and welfare 
with particular emphasis on the three EU-Mediterranean countries. For a better presentation this part is 
divided to three sub-parts. In the first part the effects on prices and production are discussed, in the 
second the net trade effects, whereas the welfare effects follow in the third and last sub-part. 
 
Price and Production Effects  
The major trends regarding the prices (farm gate price and producer incentive price), the production 
and the demand from all simulated scenarios are briefly shown in Table 2. Detailed tables of the 
changes on the production and the farm gate prices are given in the appendix (Table 4 - 12). Overall 
the decoupling of the direct payments results to a reduction of the producer incentive price – price 
which includes the farm gate price and those subsidies that are assumed to affect production – for most 
of the commodities examined, with only a few exceptions as indicated in the footnotes of Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Trends due to the CAP Reform in Greece, Italy and Spain (Scenarios 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
1) 
Commodities  Farm Gate Price  Producer Incentive Price  Production  Demand 
Wheat                       
2              
5   
Coarse Grains         
Oilseeds                        
3              
6   
Beef         
Cotton                         
4     
Tobacco                         
4     
Olive oil                         
4     
1 Scenario 5 involves changes only to cotton, tobacco, and olive oil; 
2 except of Italy; 
3 except of scenario 2 with 
initial production-effectiveness; 
4 except of scenario 1 with initial and half production-effectiveness; 
5 except of 
Greece; 
6 except of Spain and Italy in all scenarios with no production-effectiveness, where the revised trends are 
observed 
Source: own illustration according to simulation results 
 
The changes of the producer incentive prices vary between about 0.01 % (in the fifth scenario, 
with no production effectiveness by most of the products initially included in the CAP Reform) and 
140 % (for milk 2
nd scenario, initial production-effectiveness in Greece) in absolute numbers. The first 
wave of the CAP Reform affects mainly the products initially included in the Luxembourg Agreement 
(scenario 1), whereas and as expected only the second wave of the CAP Reform has impacts mainly 
on cotton, tobacco and olive oil. The changes on the producer incentive prices of poultry and pig meat 
are due to cross-price effects. It should be noted that all changes are more intense under the third sub-
scenario, where the direct payments have no effects on the production. Furthermore the scenarios 2, 3 
and 4 give only minimal differences. 
Regarding the farm gate prices, here the changes are more limited, less than 4.5 % in absolute 
numbers. They do not always follow the same trend with the producer incentive price. For example for 
wheat, coarse grains and oilseeds the farm gate price rise, whereas the producer incentive price falls. 
Although this seems to be controversial at first place, it is not. The decrease of the producer incentive   7
price is attributed to the reduced direct payments that affect the production and this reduction is more 
intense that the rise of the farm gate prices resulting in decreasing producer incentive prices. The 
changes here are again more intense when the production effectiveness is minor. 
Looking at the production, it follows the tendency shown by the producer incentive prices. This 
trend was expected because the lower producer incentive prices influence the supply and result in 
lower produced quantities. There are only two exceptions, namely by oilseeds and pig meat. The 
effects on pig meat and poultry are again attributed to cross-price effects because the production of 
these two commodities is assumed not to be directly affected by the decoupling as it does not depend 
on the available area (hectares) as it happens by other livestock products (i.e. beef and milk). The 
produced quantities of sugar and milk are not altered because of the application of quotas.  
The demand remains almost constant, since the introduced decoupled direct payments are 
supposed to influence only the production side.  
 
Net trade Effects 
Analogous tendencies with the production are shown regarding net trade. The net trade is 
estimated in the model as the difference between the production and the demand. As the demand 
remains almost stable, when the production decreases the exports decrease and the imports rise and 
vice versa. In Table 3 are shown the observed trends in Greece, Italy and Spain and the detailed table 
is included in the Appendix (Table 13). 
 
Table 3: Net trade effects* for Greece, Italy and Spain 
Commodities  Trend  Comment 
Wheat    Spain: net importer; Italy: net importer; 
Greece: net importer, change of trade status on SC1, 2, 3 and 4 
Coarse Grains    All three countries net importers 
Oilseeds    All three countries net importers 
Beef 
  Spain: net exporter, change of trade status by SC1, 2,3,4 
Italy and Greece: net importers 
Cotton    Greece and Spain: net exporters, change of trade status in Spain by 
scenarios 3, 4; Italy: net importer 
Tobacco    Italy and Spain: net importers; Greece: net exporter 
Olive oil    Greece and Spain: net exporters; Italy: net importer 
* The net trade in the model is calculated as the difference between the supply and the demand. Therefore when 
supply>demand a country (or region) is a net exporter and when supply<demand a country (or region) is a net 
importer. 
Source: own illustration based according to simulation results 
 
The Reform of the CAP results in a change of the trade status in four cases: Greece from net 
importer of wheat of about 249,000 tonnes becomes net importer of about 450,000 tonnes in the first 
scenario and of about 250,000 to 500,000 tonnes in scenarios 2,3 and 4. Regarding beef, Spain 
becomes a net importer of about 9,000 to 103,000 tonnes, depending on the production effectiveness 
in the first scenario and of 40,000 to 104,000 tonnes  in scenarios 2, 3 and 4 with half and no 
production-effectiveness, but remains net exporter of about 16,000 tonnes when the production 
effectiveness of the decoupled direct payments is the same with the coupled payments. Initially Spain 
exports about 12,000 tonnes. Again in Spain there is a change of the trade status of poultry in the first 
scenario and in the second, third and fourth scenario only with no and half production effectiveness, 
where the country exports about 9,000 to 60,000 tonnes (under the base assumption Spain is net 
importer of about 36,000 tonnes). Finally by the trade of cotton and by scenarios 3 and 4 Spain from 
net exporter of about 9,000 tonnes becomes net importer of about 3,000 tonnes. 
 
Welfare effects 
The decoupling of direct payments results in welfare losses for the producers and welfare gains to 
all other components of social welfare (quota owner, consumer, budget) in all examined scenarios (for 
detailed figures, see Table 14 in the appendix). Figure 2 presents the effects of decoupling using all the 
provisions of coupling for tobacco, olive oil and cotton (scenario 2), with parallel variation of the 
production-effectiveness.    8
The producer surplus is reduced more if the direct decoupled payments have the same influence 
with direct-coupled payments and is negative in all three examined countries. These loses though in 
the producers income could be compensated by the changes of the quota owner surplus, when the 
farmer is the owner of the quotas. The quota owner surplus is positive and it is lower when the 
production-effectiveness is lower.  
The consumer surplus remains constant with the variation of the production-effectiveness, due to 
the constant demand.  
Concerning the budget, it is positive mainly because of reduced expenditure. Nevertheless, two 
different budget effects and consequently two different total welfare effects are illustrated in the 
figures, which involve the reduced amount of direct payments of tobacco and olive oil. In the first case 
(budget effect* and total welfare* of the Figure 2 and 3), this amount is assumed to increase welfare, 
because it is no longer used as direct payments and can be used in alternative ways. This results in 
lower budget expenditure in terms of welfare. In the second case (budget effect** and total welfare**) 
this amount is not assumed to increase welfare, because it remains in the sector of the examined 
products for e.g. restructuring programs. Thus the amount is earmarked and therefore the budget 
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*, ** see text, p.7 
Figure 2: Welfare effects of decoupling on the south-EU countries using the provisions of coupling 
(scenario 2) 
 
It should also be noted that the CAP is financed according to the principle of financial solidarity. 
Thus, the budget effects will not occur in the different member states but in the EU budget. Taking 
into account the relatively low contributions of the Mediterranean member states to the EU budget, the 
welfare gains due to lower budget expenditure should be included in fact only partially in the national 
budget effects. This results in a lower change in total welfare for the Mediterranean EU countries. 
Full decoupling without the provisions of coupling (scenarios 3 and 4) results in the same trends, 
but with higher losses for producers and higher gains for the budget, due to more significantly reduced 
expenditure. 
Figure 3 compares the welfare effects of scenarios 1, 5 and 2 to show the impacts of the different 
steps of CAP reform. Scenario 1 simulates decoupling direct payments for the products initially 
included in the Luxembourg Agreement, scenario 5 simulates the hypothetical situation of decoupling 
direct payments only for cotton, olive oil and tobacco and in scenario 2 the complete CAP reform 
using all the provisions of coupling for the three products is simulated. It is shown that the markets of 
the latest products are of major importance for the Mediterranean EU Member-States, whereas for 
those countries the effects of the Luxembourg Agreement are not negligible. The losses for the 
producers are higher under the so-called Reform for the Mediterranean products, but on the other side 






































*, ** see text, p.7 
Figure 3: Welfare effects of decoupling on the southern EU Member-States (half prod.-effectiveness) 
 
The producers lose the same amount when only the Luxembourg Agreement is applied or only 
when the obligatory reform of the CAP for tobacco, olive oil and cotton would take place (scenarios 1 
and 5 respectively). Nevertheless, the latter does not provide budget gains. Again the difference on the 
budget due to the assumptions about the welfare effects of the reduced amount of direct payments of 
tobacco and olive oil is well reflected. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The Reform of the CAP and especially the Reform for the Mediterranean products tobacco, olive 
oil and cotton, as a follow up of the Luxembourg Agreement, is expected to influence and determine 
the agricultural sector of the Mediterranean member states of the EU. A key point of this reform is the 
introduction of the Single Farm Payment, whereas price cuts or adjustments were not necessary. 
The objective of this Poster has been to analyse the impacts of both waves of the CAP Reform on 
the Mediterranean Member States of the EU with a partial equilibrium model. It focuses on the 
introduced Single Farm Payment as key point of the Reform and on modelling the decoupled 
payments.  
The empirical analysis was carried out with an updated version of the model AGRISIM. The 
updates involved not only the implementation of decoupled payments in the model, but also the 
extension of the data bank of the model with the three products, namely cotton, olive oil and tobacco 
and the modelling of Greece, Italy and Spain and the rest of the EU-15 countries as separate regions. 
This contribution could be seen as a first step of modelling Mediterranean commodities and sets the 
basis of further development of the model. Nevertheless, the simulation of the decoupled direct 
payments under different scenarios does provide deeper insights concerning prices, quantities and 
welfare due to the different reform steps.  
The implementation of the reformed CAP is realised under different scenarios, whereas the 
effects of the decoupled payments on the farmers decisions regarding the production procedure are 
simulated with the variation of the term “production-effectiveness” in sub-scenarios, which serves as a 
sensitivity analysis. The simulations generate effects on production, consumption, domestic and border 
prices, trade, producer and consumer surplus, taxpayers gains or losses and overall welfare. 
Overall the preliminary results indicate a reduction of the producer incentive price – price which 
includes the farm gate price and those subsidies that are assumed to affect production – followed by a 
decrease of the produced quantities. The demand remains almost constant, since the introduced 
decoupled direct payments are supposed to influence only the production side. Analogous tendencies 
are shown regarding net trade. The exports fall and the imports rise, resulting to a change of the net 
trade status in Spain and Italy by trade of cotton and olive oil accordingly.   10
The change of producer surplus is negative in all examined scenarios and sub-scenarios, but the 
change of quota owner surplus is always positive and can compensate the losses of producer surplus. 
The reform of the CAP results in less budget expenditure. The Mediterranean member states of the EU 
are mainly affected by the reform for the Mediterranean products, whereas the pure effects of the 
Luxembourg Agreement are not negligible. 
Worth to be noted is also the fact that the scenarios 2, 3 and 4, where the different degrees of 
decoupling regarding cotton and olive oil are modelled, generate are only minimal differences. This is 
an indicator that the different implementation of the decoupling of cotton and olive oil is not of 
significant importance. 
Further work plans though are required so as to provide an overall look of effects on major 
agricultural markets of the Mediterranean countries due to recent reforms of the agricultural sector. 
They involve the extension of the model with the Mediterranean partner countries of the EU, since 
these countries are the main competitors of the southern EU member-states, with a simultaneous 
consideration of a liberalisation of the trade between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries, 
term included under the Barcelona Agreement. The markets of fruit and vegetable should also be 
examined, since both their share in the trade in the Mediterranean basin and their contribution to the 
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Appendix – Results of AGRISIM 
 
Table 4: Change of Production in Greece ( in %) 
   Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 5 
   Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness 
   initial  half  no  initial  half  no  initial  half  no 
Wheat  35.03  37.33  39.72  26.66  32.80  39.72  -1.01  -0.45  0.00 
Coarse Grains  -15.48  -13.79  -11.77  -19.60  -16.50  -11.77  -4.37  -2.39  0.00 
Oilseeds  10.38  10.27  10.32  12.39  11.92  12.17  3.84  2.75  1.65 
Sugar  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -6.08  -3.25  0.00 
Milk  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Beef  -18.99  -20.73  -22.51  -13.27  -17.77  -22.51  5.03  2.55  0.00 
Pig meat  7.48  8.41  9.34  3.36  6.05  9.34  -2.84  -1.49  0.00 
Poultry  3.14  3.49  3.81  1.26  2.42  3.80  -1.34  -0.70  0.00 
Cotton  0.37  0.15  -0.08  -4.71  -5.50  -6.34  -5.22  -5.71  -6.22 
Tobacco  0.12  0.04  -0.02  -11.57  -11.84  -12.10  -11.76  -11.91  -12.07 
Olive Oil  0.11  0.04  -0.04  -0.53  -0.75  -0.99  -0.67  -0.80  -0.94 
 
Table 5: Change of Production in Italy (in %) 
   Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 5 
   Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness 
   initial  half  no  initial  half  no  initial  half  no 
Wheat  7.28  -8.90  -26.14  13.34  -5.63  -26.14  6.15  3.09  0.00 
Coarse Grains  -19.26  -24.73  -30.40  -17.14  -23.62  -30.40  1.83  0.92  0.00 
Oilseeds  4.39  -5.49  -15.95  12.21  0.53  -12.00  8.49  6.58  4.64 
Sugar  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Milk  0.00  0.00  -4.04  0.00  0.00  -4.04  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Beef  -10.58  -14.32  -18.96  -9.20  -13.60  -18.96  1.22  0.61  0.00 
Pig meat  2.22  4.14  6.49  1.46  3.68  6.49  -0.68  -0.35  0.00 
Poultry  -0.04  0.99  2.28  -0.44  0.73  2.28  -0.41  -0.21  0.00 
Tobacco  0.38  0.17  -0.03  -14.67  -15.14  -15.59  -15.39  -15.46  -15.54 
Olive Oil  0.89  0.84  0.82  -0.94  -1.20  -1.46  -2.12  -2.17  -2.23 
 
Table 6: Change of Production in Spain (in %) 
   Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 5 
   Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness 
   initial  half  no  initial  half  no  initial  half  no 
Wheat  -3.94  -10.96  -18.57  0.21  -8.69  -18.57  3.91  1.97  0.00 
Coarse Grains  -19.35  -24.85  -30.58  -16.06  -23.12  -30.58  2.83  1.42  0.00 
Oilseeds  0.52  -9.01  -18.76  10.78  -1.86  -14.96  10.61  7.63  4.62 
Sugar  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.04  -0.02  0.00 
Milk  0.00  0.00  -1.47  0.00  0.00  -1.48  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Beef  -3.47  -10.56  -18.51  0.46  -8.42  -18.51  3.78  1.91  0.00 
Pig meat  2.55  3.79  5.21  1.70  3.29  5.21  -0.66  -0.34  0.00 
Poultry  5.10  7.53  10.34  3.67  6.67  10.33  -1.05  -0.54  0.00 
Cotton  0.40  0.18  -0.05  -5.80  -6.22  -6.66  -6.40  -6.49  -6.59 
Tobacco  0.09  0.04  -0.01  -7.65  -7.75  -7.84  -7.78  -7.80  -7.82 
Olive Oil  0.42  0.60  0.82  -0.58  -0.41  -0.17  -1.04  -1.01  -0.97 
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Table 7: Change of Producer Incentive Price in Greece (in %) 
   Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 5 
   Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness 
   initial  half  no  initial  half  no  initial  half  no 
Wheat  -24.29 -30.55 -36.83 -1.10  -18.96 -36.83 23.18 11.59 0.00
Coarse Grains  -40.73 -42.82 -44.91 -32.43  -38.67 -44.91 8.31 4.15 0.00
Oilseeds  -10.17 -15.42 -20.65 8.44  -6.14 -20.71 18.60 9.26 -0.07
Sugar  3.40 1.84 0.28 8.82  4.55 0.28 5.43 2.72 0.01
Milk  52.37 25.45 -1.09 140.35  69.43 -1.10 87.98 43.98 -0.01
Beef  -29.66 -31.89 -34.11 -22.37  -28.24 -34.11 7.29 3.64 0.00
Pigmeat  -0.43 -0.84 -1.36 -0.41  -0.83 -1.36 0.03 0.01 0.00
Poultry  -0.51 -0.82 -1.23 -0.48  -0.80 -1.23 0.02 0.01 0.00
Cotton  2.66 1.08 -0.58 -29.17  -33.23 -37.38 -31.83 -34.31 -36.80
Tobacco  0.58 0.21 -0.10 -45.92  -46.75 -47.52 -46.49 -46.96 -47.42
Olive Oil  3.64 1.08 -1.58 -15.91  -21.96 -28.13 -19.44 -22.99 -26.54
 
Table 8: Change of Producer Incentives Price in Italy (in %) 
   Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 5 
   Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness 
   initial  half  no  initial  half  no  initial  half  no 
Wheat  7.89 -14.46 -36.83 16.65 -10.08 -36.83 8.75 4.37 0.00
Coarse Grains  -29.05 -36.98 -44.91 -25.89 -35.40 -44.91 3.16 1.58 0.00
Oilseeds  7.34 -7.76 -22.83 13.15 -4.88 -22.90 5.80 2.86 -0.08
Sugar  15.93 8.10 0.28 18.94 9.61 0.28 3.02 1.52 0.01
Milk  29.55 14.04 -1.09 35.42 16.97 -1.10 5.87 2.93 -0.01
Beef  -20.14 -27.13 -34.11 -17.48 -25.80 -34.11 2.66 1.33 0.00
Pigmeat  -0.43 -0.84 -1.36 -0.41 -0.83 -1.36 0.03 0.01 0.00
Poultry  -0.51 -0.82 -1.23 -0.48 -0.80 -1.23 0.02 0.01 0.00
Cotton  8.72 4.19 -0.39 -20.43 -25.81 -31.24 -29.15 -30.00 -30.85
Tobacco  1.89 0.85 -0.13 -54.77 -55.99 -57.14 -56.64 -56.83 -57.02
Olive Oil  16.28 7.60 -1.15 -6.61 -16.86 -27.18 -22.81 -24.42 -26.02
 
Table 9: Change of Producer Incentive Prices in Spain (in %) 
   Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 5 
   Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness 
   initial  half  no  initial  half  no  initial  half  no 
Wheat  -12.54 -24.67 -36.83 -4.99 -20.91 -36.83 7.53  3.76 0.00
Coarse Grains  -28.29 -36.60 -44.91 -23.18 -34.04 -44.91 5.11  2.56 0.00
Oilseeds  -0.33 -11.70 -23.04 6.51 -8.31 -23.11 6.83  3.38 -0.08
Sugar  4.81 2.54 0.28 6.19 3.24 0.28 1.39  0.70 0.01
Milk  39.18 18.85 -1.09 51.05 24.78 -1.10 11.87  5.93 -0.01
Beef  -8.26 -21.19 -34.11 -0.68 -17.40 -34.11 7.58  3.79 0.00
Pigmeat  -0.43 -0.84 -1.36 -0.41 -0.83 -1.36 0.03  0.01 0.00
Poultry  -0.51 -0.82 -1.23 -0.48 -0.80 -1.23 0.02  0.01 0.00
Cotton  2.90 1.30 -0.35 -34.74 -36.79 -38.90 -37.64  -38.09 -38.55
Tobacco  0.47 0.18 -0.07 -32.84 -33.20 -33.52 -33.30  -33.38 -33.45
Olive Oil  6.51 2.58 -1.44 -5.50 -10.43 -15.46 -11.91  -12.96 -14.01  13
Table 10: Change of Farm Gate Prices in Greece (%) 
   Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 5 
   Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness 
   initial  half  no  initial  half  no  initial  half  no 
Wheat  1.66 3.10 4.51  1.55 3.04 4.50  -0.14 -0.07 -0.01
Coarse Grains  2.01 2.92 3.83  1.95 2.89 3.84  -0.05 -0.02 0.01
Oilseeds  0.21 0.81 1.44  0.06 0.70 1.36  -0.16 -0.13 -0.09
Sugar  0.09 0.19 0.29  0.09 0.19 0.29  0.01 0.01 0.01
Milk  -0.06 -0.14 0.19  -0.07 -0.15 0.18  0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Beef  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02  0.00 0.00 0.00
Pigmeat  -0.44 -0.86 -1.39  -0.42 -0.85 -1.40  0.03 0.01 0.00
Poultry  -0.53 -0.84 -1.27  -0.50 -0.83 -1.28  0.03 0.01 0.00
Cotton  -0.89 -1.02 -1.35  -0.70 -0.81 -1.14  0.18 0.20 0.22
Tobacco  0.04 -0.13 -0.19  0.89 0.72 0.66  0.88 0.86 0.85
Olive Oil  -1.28 -2.00 -2.91  0.35 -0.29 -1.12  1.83 1.82 1.81
 
Table 11: Change of Farm Gate Prices in Italy (%) 
   Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 5 
   Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness 
   initial  half  no  initial  half  no  initial  half  no 
Wheat  1.66  3.10 4.51  1.55 3.04  4.50 -0.14  -0.07 -0.01
Coarse Grains  2.01  2.92 3.83  1.95 2.89  3.84 -0.05  -0.02 0.01
Oilseeds  0.24  0.93 1.65  0.07 0.80  1.56 -0.18  -0.14 -0.10
Sugar  0.09  0.19 0.29  0.09 0.19  0.29 0.01  0.01 0.01
Milk  -0.06  -0.14 0.19  -0.07 -0.15  0.18 0.00  -0.01 -0.01
Beef  -0.01  -0.02 -0.02  -0.01 -0.02  -0.02 0.00  0.00 0.00
Pigmeat  -0.44  -0.86 -1.39  -0.42 -0.85  -1.40 0.03  0.01 0.00
Poultry  -0.53  -0.84 -1.27  -0.50 -0.83  -1.28 0.03  0.01 0.00
Cotton  -0.49  -0.57 -0.75  -0.39 -0.45  -0.63 0.10  0.11 0.12
Tobacco  0.07  -0.20 -0.30  1.40 1.13  1.03 1.38  1.35 1.33
Olive Oil  -0.91  -1.42 -2.08  0.25 -0.20  -0.80 1.30  1.30 1.29
 
Table 12: Change of Farm Gate Prices in Spain (%) 
   Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 5 
   Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness 
   initial  half  no  initial  half  no  initial  half  no 
Wheat  1.66  3.10 4.51 1.55  3.04 4.50 -0.14  -0.07 -0.01 
Coarse Grains  2.01  2.92 3.83 1.95  2.89 3.84 -0.05  -0.02 0.01 
Oilseeds  0.24  0.94 1.67 0.07  0.81 1.58 -0.19  -0.15 -0.10 
Sugar  0.09  0.19 0.29 0.09  0.19 0.29 0.01  0.01 0.01 
Milk  -0.06  -0.14 0.19 -0.07  -0.15 0.18 0.00  -0.01 -0.01 
Beef  -0.01  -0.02 -0.02 -0.01  -0.02 -0.02 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Pigmeat  -0.44  -0.86 -1.39 -0.42  -0.85 -1.40 0.03  0.01 0.00 
Poultry  -0.53  -0.84 -1.27 -0.50  -0.83 -1.28 0.03  0.01 0.00 
Cotton  -0.57  -0.65 -0.86 -0.45  -0.52 -0.73 0.12  0.13 0.14 
Tobacco  0.02  -0.07 -0.11 0.50  0.40 0.37 0.49  0.48 0.48 
Olive Oil  -0.84  -1.31 -1.92 0.23  -0.19 -0.74 1.20  1.20 1.19 
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Table 13: Net trade effects* (in 1000 tonnes) 
      Base assumption  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 5 
      Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness 
Country  Product  initial  half  no  initial  half  no  initial  half  no  initial  half  no 
Wheat  -249 -249 -249 407  454  504 253  371 503  -268  -258 -250 
Coarse Grains  -830 -830 -830 -1177  -1138  -1092 -1272  -1201 -1093  -931  -886 -831 
Rice  43 43 43 28  27  26 31  29 26  46  45 43 
Oilseeds  -100 -100 -100 -99  -99  -99 -99  -99 -99  -100  -100 -100 
Sugar  16 16 16 17  17  17 17  17 17  -3  6 16 
Milk  -290 -290 -290 -290  -290  -289 -290  -291 -289  -290  -290 -290 
Beef  -164 -164 -164 -176  -176  -177 -172  -175 -177  -161  -162 -164 
Pigmeat  -310 -310 -310 -304  -304  -304 -309  -307 -304  -314  -312 -310 
Poultry  -70 -70 -70 -67  -67  -67 -70  -68 -67  -72  -71 -70 
Cotton  291 291 291 291  291  289 269  265 261  267  265 263 
Tobacco  62 62 62 62  62  62 48  48 47  48  47 47 
Greece 
Olive Oil  206 206 206 202  200  197 205  202 199  209  208 207 
Wheat  -4448 -4448 -4448 -3950  -4858  -5783 -3603  -4672 -5785  -4097  -4272 -4450 
Coarse Grains  -417 -417 -417 -2783  -3508  -3825 -2514  -3367 -3826  -182  -300 -419 
Rice  706 706 706 654  622  588 666  628 588  717  711 705 
Oilseeds  -495 -495 -495 -482  -510  -539 -458  -492 -527  -470  -476 -482 
Sugar  -152 -152 -152 -151  -151  -151 -152  -151 -151  -153  -153 -153 
Milk  -1691 -1691 -1691 -1690  -1689  -2136 -1690  -1689 -2137  -1691  -1691 -1691 
Beef  -266 -266 -266 -389  -429  -477 -374  -421 -477  -253  -260 -266 
Pigmeat  -947 -947 -947 -941  -921  -894 -952  -928 -894  -958  -953 -948 
Poultry  75 75 75 67  77  90 62  74 90  70  72 75 
Cotton  -271 -271 -271 -272  -271  -271 -272  -271 -271  -271  -271 -271 
Tobacco  16 16 16 17  17  17 -1  -2 -2  -3  -3 -3 
Italy 
Olive Oil  -231 -231 -231 -232  -235  -238 -232  -236 -239  -232  -232 -232 
Wheat  -2792 -2792 -2792 -2942  -3242  -3530 -2757  -3141 -3531  -2619  -2705 -2793 
Coarse Grains  -3040 -3040 -3040 -5287  -5944  -6456 -4901  -5740 -6457  -2712  -2876 -3042 
Rice  329 329 329 202  194  186 206  196 186  333  331 329 
Oilseeds  -537 -537 -537 -534  -566  -597 -499  -541 -584  -500  -511 -521 
Sugar  -103 -103 -103 -100  -100  -100 -100  -100 -100  -104  -103 -103 
Milk  -51 -51 -51 -43  -43  -140 -44  -44 -141  -52  -52 -52 
Beef  12 12 12 -9  -54  -103 16  -40 -103  36  24 12 
Spain 
Pigmeat  361 361 361 405  430  460 380  415 459  342  351 361   15 
Table 13 – continued  
      Base assumption  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 5 
      Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness 
Country  Product  initial  half  no  initial  half  no  initial  half  no  initial  half  no 
Poultry  -36 -36  -36 9 33 60  -5 24  60 -47  -42 -37 
Cotton  9 9  9 10 9 9  3 3  3 3  3 3 
Tobacco  -47 -47  -47 -47 -47 -47  -50 -50  -50 -50  -50 -50 
Spain 
Olive Oil  482 482  482 485 487 489  477 478  481 474  474 475 
* The net trade is calculated as the difference between the supply and the demand. 
Table 14: Change of Welfare (in million US $) 
      Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4  Scenario 5 
      Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness  Production-effectiveness 
      initial  half  no  initial  half  no  initial  half  no  initial  half  no  initial  half  no 
Producer Surplus  -541  -423  -309 -1,052  -739  -433  -1,209  -804  -405  -1,319  -964  -615  -547  -336  -124 
Quota Owner Surplus  511  384  258 909  584  258  1,096  679  258  993  626  258  424  212  0 
Consumer Surplus  13  16  19 5  8  10  0  3  4  0  3  4  -9  -9  -9 
Budget effects*  -1  -2  -3 181  180  178  172  169  165  382  379  375  190  186  181 
Total Welfare*  -18  -25  -34 43  33  14  59  46  22  57  45  22  59  53  48 
Budget effects**  -1  -2  -3 12  11  9  3  1  -3  3  1  -3  21  18  13 
Greece 
Total Welfare**  -18  -25  -24 -125  -136  -145  -109  -122  -136  -322  -334  -346  -110  -115  -121 
Producer Surplus  -795  -61  344 -1,214  -312  229  -1,356  -366  245  -1,505  -601  -59  -353  -231  -112 
Quota Owner Surplus  1,014  392  38 1,250  509  38  1,368  568  38  1,250  509  38  231  115  0 
Consumer Surplus  59  68  69 41  49  50  29  36  35  30  36  35  -19  -19  -19 
Budget effects*  115  171  284 255  323  447  242  314  443  557  623  747  63  109  155 
Total Welfare*  393  570  735 332  569  763  283  551  761  331  567  761  -78  -26  24 
Budget effects**  115  171  284 104  171  296  90  162  292  101  168  292  -89  -43  3 
Italy 
Total Welfare**  393  570  733 181  417  609  132  400  607  -124  112  304  -230  -178  -128 
Producer Surplus  -725  -231  162 -1,067  -396  150  -1,239  -455  185  -1,437  -746  -184  -287  -146  -8 
Quota Owner Surplus  902  441  34 1,168  576  34  1,327  656  34  1,193  588  34  270  135  0 
Consumer Surplus  66  81  95 52  66  80  42  56  69  43  56  69  -15  -15  -15 
Budget effects*  -28  24  89 7  74  154  -15  60  149  368  436  519  -53  1  56 
Total Welfare*  215  315  380 160  320  418  115  317  437  166  334  437  -86  -25  33 
Budget effects**  -28  24  89 -44  22  103  -66  8  98  -53  15  98  -105  -51  4 
Spain 
Total Welfare**  215  315  378 108  268  364  64  265  383  -255  -87  14  -138  -77  -19 
*, ** see text p. 7 